I'm helping OWASP with the awesome but recently neglected .NET project. There is a lot of great .NET security stuff out there <cough> troyhunt </cough> and I am helping them organize and broaden it.
There is a roadmap started and I would like the community's feedback. There is a lot of work to do and we are going to need a lot of help doing it.
Feel free to email me, use the contact form, contact OWASP, sign up for the .NET Project email list, tweet me, or do what ever makes the most sense. We need your input.
As both a software architect and a vulnerability assessor, I am often asked why bother to test applications that are inside the firewall.
It's a pretty valid question, and one that I asked a lot when working in the enterprise space. To the casual observer, network access seems to be an insurmountable hurdle to getting to an application. For years, I argued against even using a login on internal sites, to improve usability. That perspective changed once I started learning about security in the 90s, but I still didn't give applications that I knew would be internal to the firewall due rigor until I started testing around 2002.
This all comes down to the basic security concept of Security In Depth. Yes, I know it is a buzzword (buzzphrase?) but the concept is sound - layers of security will help cover you when a mistake is made. Fact is, there are a fair number of reasons to make sure internal apps meet the same rigor as external apps. I have listed a few below. If you can think of any more, list them in the comments below.
The network is not a barrier
Protecting the network is hard. Just like application vulnerabilities are hard to glean out, network vulnerabilities are hard to keep up with. Unlike application vulnerability management, handling vulnerabilities is less about ticket management and more about vendor management.
A lot of attacks on companies are through the network. Aside from flaws in devices and software, we have social attacks too.
Fact is, the network layer isn't a guarantee against access. It is very good, but not perfect. If there is a breach, then the attackers will take advantage of whatever they find. Now think about that: once I have an IP address, I am going to look for a server to take over. Just like if I am on the Internet: finding a server to own is the goal. Once I am inside your network, the goal stays the same.
People who shouldn't have access often do
You probably heard about the Target breach. If not, read up. The whole thing was caused by a vendor with evisting VPN access getting breached, and then that VPN access being used to own the Point Of Sale systems. Here's a question for you:
How did a HVAC vendor have access to the POSs?
It's possible to give very specific access to users. It's just hard. Not technically hard, just demanding. Every time something in the network changes, you have to change the model. Because there are a limited number of hours in the day, we let things go. After we have let a certain number of things go, the authentication system becomes a little more like a free for all.
Most vendors have a simple authentication model - you are in or you are out. Once you have passed the requirements for being 'in' you have VPN access and you are inside the firewall. After that, if you want to see what your ex-girlfriend's boyfriend is up to, then it is up to you. The network isn't going to stop you.
You can't trust people inside the network
In the same vein, even employees can't totally be trusted. This gets into the social and psychological sides of this business where I have no business playing, but there is no question that the people that work for you have a vested interest in the data that is stored. Be it HR data or product information, there are a number of factors that could persuade your established users to have a let us say 'gathering interest.' I know it is hard to hear - it is hard for me to write. Fact is, the people that work for you need to be treated with some caution. Not like the enemy, mind you, but certainly with reasonable caution.
Applications are often moved into the DMZ
From the developer's perspective, frankly this is the biggest issue. Applications, particularly web applications, are often exposed after time. A partner needs it, the customers need it, some vendor needs it, we have been bought, we bought someone, whatever. Setting up federated identity usually doesn't move at the speed of business, and middle managers will just say 'put it in the DMZ.'
This happens a LOT with web services. Around 2004 everyone rewrote their middle tier to be SOAP in order to handle the requests of the front end devs, who were trying to keep up with the times. Around 2011, when the services were old and worn and everyone was used to them servicing the web server under the covers, the iPhone came out.
Then you needed The App. you know that meeting, after the CIO had played with her niece's iPhone at Memorial Day, and prodded the CEO, and he decided The App must be done. But the logic for the app was in the services, and the CIO said 'that's why we made services! Just make them available to the app!
But. Were they tested? Really? Same rigor as your public web? I bet not. Take a second look.
Just test everything
Moral of the story is: just test everything. Any application is a new attack surface, with risk associated. If you are a dev, or in QA, or certainly in security, just assume that every application needs to be tested. It's the best overall strategy.